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Health care institutions and medical educators assert that empathy is essential to optimum patient care, yet medical education and the practice of medicine often neglect empathy 
in favor of biomedical approaches to disease and injury. This essay dis-
cusses the development in medical literature of the concept of “clinical 
empathy”—which attempts to reorient a biomedical, disease-centered 
approach to treating illness by accounting for an increasing fluency 
within the interpersonal relations between physician and patient—and 
examines arguments for supplementing medical training with the study 
of literature and the practice of reflective writing as a means of develop-
ing empathy in physicians. In order to interrogate the problems as well 
as the possibilities of clinical empathy, I turn to theories of sympathy 
produced in the eighteenth century, when innovations in medical tech-
nology and knowledge had only begun to create separate categories that 
would ultimately untwine the body from mind and culture. The eigh-
teenth century was also a time when philosophy and literature, rather 
than being compartmentalized from medicine as distinct disciplines, 
informed medical understandings before medicine became specialized 
as a “science.” A critical approach to the theory and literature of the 
eighteenth century can help to formulate a productive critique of clini-
cal empathy in contemporary medicine and to suggest possibilities for 
a reconfigured and strengthened understanding of empathy within the 
larger social context of institutions, systems, and access to care.
I. The Contemporary Debate
The ongoing debate in medical education and in clinical practice about 
the importance of empathy illustrates a divided approach to patient care. 
Those who argue for empathy (or at least for concern for the patient’s 
sociocultural and personal experience of illness) are countering what is 
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seen as a predominantly biomedical approach. This divide is often charac-
terized as disease-centered care versus patient-centered care. The debate 
about whether disease and pathology are alone responsible for illness 
and disability or whether (and how much) physicians should focus on the 
patient’s experience of illness unfolds on different levels of discourse and 
learning. While medical schools, professional organizations, and journal 
articles advocate empathy in patient care, the practice in hospital wards 
and clinics often contradicts or undercuts that commitment, emphasiz-
ing scientific knowledge at the expense of symbolic and affective aspects 
of illness. (It is widely acknowledged that the role modeling of senior 
physicians in clinics and wards has far more influence on trainees than 
does institutional advocacy or classroom instruction.)1
Those physicians and medical educators who advocate empathy in the 
patient-physician encounter often cite studies suggesting that physicians 
who engage empathically with patients increase not only the patient’s 
sense of “satisfaction” but also patient compliance with therapeutic regi-
mens and increased physiological well-being.2 Physician Howard Spiro 
echoes both psychological studies and anecdotal perceptions suggesting 
that medical students begin their training with “a cargo of empathy” that 
is then displaced when “we teach them to see themselves as experts, to 
fix what is damaged, and to ‘rule out’ disease in their field.”3 Spiro views 
cadaver dissection, the emphasis on basic science, and the primacy of 
medical imaging as dangerously objectifying the patient.4 
While many in medicine agree that empathy needs to be taught and 
practiced, there is not yet consistency and clarity in the medical litera-
ture about what empathy is and how it works. Some physicians discuss 
empathy casually, without clearly defining it, as in Jerome Lowenstein’s 
essay “Can You Teach Compassion?”5 Others define it haphazardly, mak-
ing use of aesthetic and psychological definitions interchangeably. For 
example, Spiro supplements a definition from Scribner’s Dictionary of 
the History of Ideas with brief mentions of Freud, Buber, Jung, and even 
John Donne.6 Still others cite psychology, psychoanalysis, and aesthetic 
theory to historicize and deepen their definitions of clinical empathy. 
All too often, discussions of empathy in the clinic do not engage with 
earlier formulations of it in the medical literature. However, some of its 
proponents have made good use of psychological studies of empathy. 
The most rigorous of these approaches address empathy as a faculty that 
involves both feeling and reason. For example, in describing the language 
physicians should use with patients in order to “build empathy,” John 
L. Coulehan and his co-authors follow psychological models employing 
both cognitive and emotional components. They go further than authors 
who see empathy primarily as a benefit the physician bestows upon the 
patient by insisting that empathy is a collaboration with the patient that 
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involves an “action component”: physicians must “check back” with pa-
tients to confirm or to correct their shared understanding.7
Physicians Jochanan Benbassat and Reuben Baumal describe empathy 
as a “multiple-phase process” that begins with insight into the patient’s 
“concerns, feelings, and sources of distress,” followed by “discomfort” 
that the patient’s distress produces in the physician, and then, impor-
tantly, by a “desire to remove the cause of distress or at least alleviate it.”8 
Benbassat and Baumal not only emphasize the significance of acting to 
relieve the distress of the other, they also recognize that “each of these 
steps has mediating variables that influence whether empathy progresses 
or an alternate terminal point is reached.”9 This definition makes clear 
that physicians may experience a kind of empathy without feeling com-
pelled to alleviate distress; this passive response is better understood as 
emotional resonance. Ethically speaking, empathy is incomplete when 
it does not lead to an “attempt to help.” Benbassat and Baumal caution 
that doctors must not fail to “progress” from psychological engagement 
to material aid, and they warn that the insights provided by such psy-
chological engagement may also be used “to harm or manipulate.”10 
Less activist physicians may see the end point of empathy as a satisfied, 
retrospective awareness of simply having cared.
The persistent objection to empathy in medical culture derives from 
the now decades-old arguments in the literature voicing the concern that 
empathy interferes with scientific and medical objectivity. Jodi Halpern, a 
psychiatrist with a doctorate in philosophy, offers the most complex and 
thorough response to such arguments. Her book From Detached Concern 
to Empathy: Humanizing Medical Practice rejects the dominant medical 
concepts of “neutral empathy” and “detached concern” as constructed by 
outdated early twentieth-century preoccupations with scientific objectiv-
ity and truth. Halpern draws on psychoanalytic concepts to support her 
claim that practitioners are inevitably “sympathetically immersed” when 
making decisions about patients. What practitioners need, according to 
Halpern, are the skills to use their emotional responses for therapeutic 
impact.11 Arguing that in the “interpersonal realm emotions are crucial 
for understanding reality,” Halpern crafts a complex understanding of 
clinical empathy that is partly cognitive and partly grounded in “emo-
tional reasoning,” that is, an awareness of one’s associations and emo-
tional resonances as cues to understanding the “particular meanings 
that a symptom or a diagnosis has for an individual.”12 The physician 
uses that emotional awareness imaginatively to understand the patient’s 
experience. Halpern thus redefines empathy as incorporating emotion 
into a reasoned understanding of a patient’s experience as a prelude 
to therapeutic intervention. (Neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga’s work 
on new brain imaging studies supports the role of emotions in moral 
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reasoning. These studies suggest that when someone is willing to act on 
a moral belief, it is because the emotional part of the brain has become 
active when the moral question is considered; similarly, when someone 
decides not to act on a moral question, it is because the emotional part 
of the brain does not become active.)13
The question for many medical educators remains whether empathy, 
no matter how valuable or how carefully reconfigured, can be taught. 
Halpern suggests that practitioners can develop clinical empathy through 
self-education and self-awareness; others suggest various approaches for 
teaching it to medical students. Lowenstein, a nephrologist, suggests that 
empathy be taught like other practice-oriented aspects of medicine. He 
sees an opportunity for teaching empathy in the “case presentation,” 
where students and interns see patients at the bedside and “present the 
case” to the senior physician by describing the patient’s medical history, 
diagnosis of the current illness, and suggested treatment. Typically case 
presentations are shorthand recitations of the objective “facts” of the 
patient’s illness and contributing factors, such as obesity and alcohol or 
tobacco use, often without regard for how the patient might feel about 
being objectified in terms of addiction and disease. Lowenstein sees case 
presentations as opportunities for clinicians to teach students empathy by 
encouraging them to describe patients more fully as persons with intersect-
ing social, psychological, and medical histories, rather than reductively 
and disparagingly in terms of disorders, addictions, and disease.14 
Many physicians and other medical professionals advocate training 
students and practitioners in empathy through the study of literary 
texts and narrative techniques, an approach described as “literature 
and medicine” or medical humanities, and practiced by PhDs in English 
teaching in medical schools or by MDs with some training in literary 
studies and/or creative writing. This approach at its most sophisticated 
insists on a complex understanding of the crucial role that narrative and 
metaphor play in framing social and ethical aspects of health care. It 
recommends interdisciplinary engagement as an indispensable means 
of bridging the “bifurcations” of the sciences and humanities, expressed 
in such conventional dualisms as hard data versus soft data, knowledge 
versus opinion, fact versus value, and cognition versus affect.15 Some 
physicians and literature and medicine scholars recommend “reflective 
writing” as a means of encouraging medical students and health care 
practitioners to understand patients’ experiences. Some of this writing 
can be understood as an exercise in projection rather than reflection. 
In some schools, for example, first-year medical students interview a 
patient and then write a medical history from the patient’s perspective. 
The exercise is designed to “elicit” the “story of a patient’s life and cir-
cumstances” and to help physicians “to establish the appropriate stance 
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from which to regard the patient” and to know “where a patient is coming 
from.”16 This exercise raises questions that are central to the problem of 
empathy. What part, if any, of a narrative that is written as if it were the 
patient’s perspective accurately represents the patient’s point of view if 
the narrative is written by a medical professional? What measures, if any, 
are taken to ensure that the narrative is written in collaboration with the 
patient and is not simply a practitioner’s projection and appropriation of 
the patient’s life-story, another kind of mastery of discourse over which 
the professional assumes authority? The physician is, after all, “regarding 
the patient,” a phrase that appropriately conjures Foucault’s articulation 
of the clinical gaze. How do such exercises in empathy represent the 
patient’s difference or (if it is possible within the institutional discipline 
of medicine) a counter-gaze?
The problem of empathy begins with the preoccupation with self that 
obscures the other. Empathy depends on the experiences and imagination 
of the person who is empathizing, and this dependency has the potential 
to obfuscate or exclude the patient’s suffering and the meaning the pa-
tient makes of suffering. A related problem arises with affinity, the way 
empathy is more likely to occur when the object of empathy resembles 
the practitioner. Eric Larson and Xin Yao acknowledge that most find it 
easier to empathize with persons “who are like themselves,” and yet they 
do not further address problems that could be created by the link between 
empathy and affinity.17 Theories of clinical empathy must account for 
the way that recognizing the patient as like oneself or seeing the patient 
as “other” factors into both the emotional and cognitive components of 
empathy. Howard Spiro assumes that the patient’s difference is a kind 
of knowledge that physicians are capable of mastering with modest ef-
fort: “Training in continuing care will be of little value without doctors 
who know something of the life of the people whom they serve; who can 
empathize with immigrants from Asia and Mexico, with the southern or 
ghetto experience; and who knew of the Holocaust and of communist 
oppression.”18 Physicians and trainees, however, should be cautioned 
that “knowing something” of other cultures and peoples does not mean 
knowing a particular person’s experience of illness. In fact, this kind of 
knowing should supplement the awareness that it is impossible to fully 
know another’s experience. Physicians who learn about the cultural and 
social factors that condition their patients’ health and compliance with 
treatment regimens will provide better health care, as long as they work 
with the patients themselves to learn about the accuracy of their assump-
tions. In other words, physicians should suspend, even if briefly, their 
role as experts in order to encourage patients to speak for themselves 
about their experiences of illness and its meanings.
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Jodi Halpern sees physicians’ and patients’ different cultural back-
grounds as a motivation for, rather than a significant challenge to, clinical 
empathy. She recognizes that physicians have “inadvertent prejudices 
toward people with values and backgrounds distinct from their own.” 
The solution for Halpern is for physicians to develop “tolerance and 
empathy for patients from diverse backgrounds.”19 Tolerance and em-
pathy, however, are not identical. Tolerance implies co-existing realities 
rather than the ideal of a reality that is shared empathically by clinician 
and patient. While tolerance may not ameliorate the power imbalance 
in the patient-physician encounter, neither does it obscure it through 
an imagined affinity. 
It is worth exploring the problems with empathy that entangle Halpern, 
who ranks among its most thoughtful proponents, since difficulties in 
her careful account suggest dilemmas that need to be recognized and 
resolved if the practice of clinical empathy is to be truly ethical. Halpern’s 
theory of empathy rightly illuminates the interpersonal aspects of the 
clinical encounter and advocates physician self-awareness. However, it 
needs to be more clearly situated within the social context of medicine, 
a context that determines the patient-physician power differential. She 
acknowledges difficulties inherent in the social arrangements of “health 
care systems that routinely under-serve the poor.”20 Her emphasis on the 
subtleties of empathy, however, diverts attention from power imbalances 
that contribute to inequities in care. For example, Halpern often illus-
trates her points with anecdotes from her medical experience (which she 
describes as “cases,” thus drawing rhetorically on the presumed scientific 
objectification of individual experience), and her configuration of such 
clinical “cases” reiterates the power of the physician to be empathic. 
Whether physicians err in understanding and thus treating the patient 
(as Halpern candidly describes in analyzing her own missteps as a psy-
chiatrist) or whether they use empathy to achieve her ideal of a “full, as 
well as accurate, understanding of a patient’s problems,” physicians hold 
the power of interpretation that determines outcomes for sick patients. 
Halpern gives an example of her own mastery of this full understanding 
of patients in her dramatic narration of breaking though to a distressed 
and distrustful patient through empathy: “As I spoke he turned to look 
directly at me with tears in his eyes, and we began to work together.”21 
In this narrative, the physician is clearly in control of the empathic en-
counter as well as shaping the interpretation of the story. One wonders 
if this is how the patient would have written it.
Elsewhere Halpern distinguishes between “fully imagining” the experi-
ence of the patient and merely projecting onto the patient. She acknowl-
edges that the physician’s imagined experience of the patient may be 
inaccurate and in need of ongoing dialogue, but she does not doubt 
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that such accuracy is possible. Moreover, she asserts that the “guiding 
intention of empathy is to grasp the situation of another person.”22 Despite 
these significant, if muted, qualifications, however, Halpern’s definition 
of clinical empathy situates the patient’s experience squarely within the 
realm of the physicians’ expertise.23 Where some might caution physi-
cians against assuming that they can fully understand the experience of 
patients, Halpern argues that physicians should imagine “how it feels to 
have a certain illness, disability, or psychological injury.” Recommending 
that physicians use pronouns such as “I” and “he” interchangeably, Halp-
ern enables appropriation of the patient’s experience through subject 
positions.24 (Similarly, Spiro claims that empathy is evident when “‘I and 
you’ becomes ‘I am you,’ or at least ‘I might be you.’”25) Halpern argues 
that empathic understanding is more like the “first-person experiential 
knowledge of an agent anticipating her own acts than it is like the third-
person predictions of an observer.”26 Her articulation of the distinction 
between the necessary imagining of a patient’s experience and what 
would amount to an appropriation of that experience is too nuanced 
to avoid misunderstandings. It neglects where it should emphasize that 
the patient experience is difficult to understand because it is beyond the 
physician’s mastery. In regards to the experience of pain and illness, the 
patient rather than the physician is the expert.
The problems of empathy surface in the very sophistication and com-
plexity of Halpern’s argument. That complexity is a welcome correction 
to the lack of clarity and consistency in other accounts, but in elaborat-
ing the subtleties of physicians resonating emotionally with patients in 
order to recognize the meaning of their suffering, Halpern subverts 
the important issues of the power differential in the patient-physician 
encounter and the alterity of the patient’s experience. The problems 
are compounded in an abbreviated version of her argument published 
in the Journal of General Internal Medicine (JGIM), an article that Halp-
ern describes as geared toward the “busy physician reader.”27 While she 
professes that the “whole point of empathy is to focus attention on the 
patient,” Halpern’s emphasis on moving past “detached concern” and 
her condensed definition of clinical empathy obscure rather than stress 
patients’ authority over their own experience. By focusing her physician 
readers’ attention on emotional self-attunement and imagining “what it 
feels like to experience something,” that is, what it is like to be the patient, 
Halpern obscures the patient.28 The fact that she composes her JGIM 
article to persuade the task-oriented and likely skeptical reader—describ-
ing “4 ways that physicians can capitalize on their emotional responses” 
and how “resonance offers short cuts”—suggests that empathy can be 
reduced to a pragmatic formula. Her book, on the contrary, suggests 
that clinical empathy must be understood as complex and nuanced in 
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order to be practiced ethically. Neither book nor article sufficiently ad-
dresses the economic, political, and cultural factors that determine both 
physician power and patient needs.
II. Sympathy in the Eighteenth Century
While the term empathy (and its German precedent einfühlung) derive 
from early twentieth-century psychoanalytic and aesthetic theory, the 
term has a deeper history in the theories and practices of sympathy, and 
in the related concept sensibility, developed in the eighteenth century. 
A step back to examine theories of sympathy, developed when science 
and the humanities were not yet opposed as disciplines, illuminates 
problems inherent in empathy as it is configured in contemporary 
medical knowledge and practice. While the humanist practices of eigh-
teenth-century authors and physician-writers obviously cannot serve as 
a model for twenty-first-century practitioners and their patients, they 
allow us to imagine a different set of disciplinary relations than exist 
at present among literary studies, cultural theory, and biomedicine. In 
the eighteenth century, medicine, philosophy, and literature evolved as 
interrelated discourses producing a theoretical matrix of understanding 
that integrated body, feeling, and mind. This matrix developed as the 
ancient and increasingly archaic humoral theory gave way to late-eigh-
teenth-century theories of sensibility.
Helen Deutsch and John Mullan detail the interdependencies of eigh-
teenth-century medicine and literature—including a shared preoccupa-
tion with disease and the body—which Deutsch describes as a “mutual 
identification of authors and doctors.”29 Literature and medicine were 
intertwined through the overlapping cultural work of medical texts, 
theories of the sublime and sensibility, and the novel of sentiment. No-
tions of the sympathetic or sensible interrelation of body, feeling, and 
mind were developed in medical treatises, and theories of sympathy and 
sensibility are set forth in the philosophical writings of Edmund Burke, 
David Hume, and Adam Smith, and in novels of sensibility, such as those 
by Samuel Richardson, Laurence Sterne, and Henry Mackenzie.30 What 
preoccupied those writing on sensibility was the contradiction of an ideal 
of an extreme sensitivity that also holds the potential to be debilitating, 
a contradiction suggestive of the contemporary concern that clinical 
empathy, while greatly valued, can also lead to a physician’s disabling 
overidentification with the patient.31
Medical technology in the eighteenth century could do relatively little 
for the sick or injured patient. Consequently, the social aspects of medi-
cal practice bore much of the weight of prevention, treatment, and cure 
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and influenced theories of suffering and empathy.32 Health and illness 
were understood in terms of interrelations among the body, the mind, 
and feeling, as reflected in the eighteenth-century concept of a person’s 
constitution—a term used to describe general health and vitality as inte-
grated with the condition of the mind, disposition, and temperament.33 
The idea of constitution was foundational to humoral theory, which 
related health to the balance of bodily fluids, a theory current in the 
late eighteenth century despite the emergence of modern experimental 
physiology, developments in disease theory, and other medical advances 
that superseded humoral theory scientifically but not culturally. The 
perseverance of humoral theory even into the nineteenth century along-
side increasingly common disease-centered practices, such as smallpox 
inoculation, may be explained by its foundation in an integrated economy 
of body, feeling, and mind. Medical educators and practitioners today 
are mirroring the perspective of humoral theory in seeking to reinte-
grate body, emotion, and mind, as well as in attempting to establish an 
equilibrium in which scientific knowledge exists in relation to cultural, 
social, and psychological understandings of the body.
Sensibility, a concept that similarly expresses the interconnectedness of 
body, affect, and mind, was seen as an integration of physiological sense 
perception with emotional sensitivity and with reason. The Encyclopaedia 
Britannica in 1797 describes sensibility as “a nice and delicate perception 
of pleasure or pain, beauty or deformity” that “seems to depend upon 
the organization of the nervous system.”34 Significantly, perception and 
the body are linked with aesthetics, as “beauty or deformity” align with 
pleasure and pain. Indeed, the integration of bodily perception with 
aesthetic experience found a basis in medical treatises on the nervous 
system, such as Robert Whytt’s 1751 Essay on the Vital and Other Invol-
untary Motions of Animals. Whytt saw the soul as integrated throughout 
the body, and his developments in understanding the nervous system 
as a faculty comprised of attributes of both body and mind (along with 
the work of William Cullen, the younger Alexander Monro, and John 
Gregory) asserted the unity of body and mind in opposition to Cartesian 
dualism.35 Whytt’s claims established a physiological basis for the work of 
eighteenth-century Scottish moral philosophers, who advanced a social 
understanding of sympathy as an innate moral sense that is part instinct, 
part affect.36 The individual body, through its “sympathetic” physiology, 
became in effect a model for the social body. Eighteenth-century sym-
pathy is similar to modern-day empathy in that a feeling of distress for 
another’s suffering motivates the social response, the act of relieving that 
suffering. (David Hume and Edmund Burke also describe the “pleasure” 
or “delight” that is a physically felt moral approbation accompanying 
benevolent actions.) What is different is the way that eighteenth-century 
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philosophers perceived sympathy as a hard-wired system that transmits 
the “sentiments” of one person to another as physically felt sensations. 
Further, Hume and another philosopher concerned with sympathy, 
Adam Smith, believed that people’s bodies predetermined their ability to 
sympathize (laborers and “savages” were relatively insensible to physical 
pain and therefore incapable of sympathy).
The eighteenth-century model of physiologically based sympathy as 
an innate partaking of another’s suffering (at least for those refined 
enough to feel deeply) brought with it anxiety about collateral harm. 
In their analyses of sympathy, eighteenth-century thinkers such as Burke 
and Hume struggled with one frightening aspect of it, the potentially 
harmful experience of sharing too completely in another’s suffering, 
much as modern medicine struggles with concerns about overidentifica-
tion and lost objectivity in theories of clinical empathy. Both Burke and 
Hume argued for mediating pain through representations of suffering in 
literature and visual art as a means of generating sympathy.37 A modern-
day parallel to Burke and Hume’s arguments is the claim put forth by 
literature and medicine scholars that the study of literature is a means 
of engaging with suffering without being overwhelmed by it. This claim 
should address the same questions about the ethicality of that aesthetic 
distance as those raised by criticisms of eighteenth-century practices of 
mediation. 
Claudia Johnson critiques the tendency in eighteenth-century senti-
mental literature to reduce its subjects, usually females in distress, to 
spectacles of suffering in order to exercise the moral sympathy of the 
elite male onlooker. Johnson illustrates this mode of sympathy (as self-
gratifying pity rather than Hume’s and Burke’s social sympathy) with an 
example from Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France, where Burke 
“cries again and again, not over Marie-Antoinette herself, who bears her 
sorrow like a Roman, but rather over the ‘description’ of her which he 
himself has wrought.”38 Johnson’s criticism suggests that it is possible 
to manipulate an encounter with suffering in ways that are ultimately, 
even if unknowingly, self-serving. This same challenge must be made to 
those in medical humanities who assert that the study of literature and 
the production of reflective writing necessarily provide a “grounding 
for empathic attention to patients.”39 Does the empathy one feels when 
reading literature necessarily lead to greater empathy in the clinical 
setting? Physicians sensitive to ethical problems in literary texts are not 
necessarily sensitive to ethical problems in the clinic. Johnson’s (and oth-
ers’) critiques of sympathy remind us that clinicians who read literature 
as imaginative mediation, or as a means to understand the experience 
of real-life patients, must beware of tendencies to aestheticize illness in 
ways that subtly discount a patient’s suffering while according physicians 
the comfort of fictive distance.
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The theory of sympathy and sensibility that most fully addresses the 
limits of an imaginative response to illness and suffering is found in 
the work of Adam Smith, a key thinker in eighteenth-century Scottish 
moral philosophy.40 Influenced by physicians Whytt and Cullen, Smith 
describes sympathy as produced by the nervous system in response to 
the spectacle of another’s pleasure or pain.41 While this is an innate 
physiological process, the degree of feeling is mediated not only by the 
body but also by the imagination. In his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), 
Smith both asserts and qualifies an imaginative identification with suf-
fering. It is the imagination, he writes, that allows us to place ourselves 
in the situation of the sufferer: “we conceive ourselves enduring all the 
same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some 
measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his 
sensations and even feel something which, although weaker in degree, 
is not altogether unlike them.”42 Smith qualifies identification with the 
sufferer, seeing it as the same in kind but not in degree. The ethics of 
sympathy, for Smith, depend on the ability to imagine the suffering of 
another, and the imagination both enables sympathy and enforces its 
limit: “We have no immediate experience of what other men feel; we can 
form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving 
what we ourselves should feel in the like situation.”43 He further qualifies 
the limits of sympathy by addressing its mediation in literature, arguing 
that while we sympathize with suffering in novels, that sympathy is far 
different from actual human suffering. 
In suggesting another limit to the power of sympathy in the face of 
suffering, Smith raises a further concern for clinical empathy. Socially 
determined responses to suffering, such as disgust, often overcome 
feelings of sympathy: “Violent hunger, for example, though upon many 
occasions not only natural, but unavoidable, is always indecent, and to 
eat voraciously is universally regarded as a piece of ill manners.”44 Dis-
gust, a product of socialization (what Smith calls manners), outweighs 
sympathy in this instance. While Smith consciously articulates one limit 
of sympathy—the way in which it is socially constructed—his work pres-
ents an unself-conscious example of that social constructedness when 
he distinguishes between cultures and peoples capable of sympathy. He 
describes sympathy as a component of civilization, a product of historical 
progress, and thereby excludes marginal groups from what is essentially 
an elite society of sympathy. “Savages” and the laboring poor are in his 
view insensible to social or physical feeling and therefore incapable of 
sympathetic relations. Sympathy thus becomes an argument for social 
distinctions and for protecting elite society from the “coarsening” effects 
of labor. “Before we can feel much for others,” Smith asserts, “we must in 
some measure be at ease ourselves.”45 Smith’s social sympathy, in effect, 
depends upon a careful calibration of comfort and distress. Proponents 
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of clinical empathy must determine whether it is possible to create a 
paradigm that controls or mediates suffering without that mediation 
doing violence by distancing patients from a sympathetic elite. It is tempt-
ing to reject sympathy altogether on these grounds, and yet a wholesale 
rejection ignores the need for clinicians to recognize and work with their 
emotional responses to patients and to in some way distance themselves 
from patients’ suffering. The limits of sympathy, as well as its possible 
abuses, do not preclude the possibility of face-to-face empathetic encoun-
ters that provide the physician with knowledge (however imperfect) and 
that provide the patient with connection (however imperfect).
III. The Return to Empathy
Smith’s emphasis on an ethical practice of sympathy as at once enabled 
and limited by the imagination offers an important qualification to the 
practice of clinical empathy. It cautions physicians that they cannot 
disentangle themselves from their position of authority over patients. 
Because physicians and other health care practitioners wield the power 
of expertise and influence the patient’s experience through prescribed 
treatments, it is essential that they recognize clinical empathy as ultimately 
a component of the medical technology and knowledge with which 
physicians manage patients. The dangers are clear: physicians who feel 
confident of their mastery of patient experience as medical knowledge 
may see themselves as empathic when that self-conception is in fact an-
other mechanism of medical authority. Thinking that empathy is more 
first-person experiential knowledge than first-person observation, that “I 
am you” is a more ethical way of framing “I and you,” risks denying the 
subjectivity and agency of the patient. 
Renaissance scholar Stephen Greenblatt articulates a useful suspicion 
of the way that empathy masks the exercise of power. Empathy involves 
“insert[ing] oneself into the consciousness of another,” he argues, and 
functions as a kind of “psychic mobility” that enables Western coloni-
zation of non-Western territories and societies.46 Greenblatt identifies 
power and improvisation as two important elements of empathy (both 
of which are relevant to the clinical encounter) and cautions against 
the “mystification of manipulation as disinterested empathy.” He warns 
that the “imagined self-loss” of empathy in effect “conceals its opposite: 
a ruthless displacement and absorption of the other. Empathy, as the 
German Einfülung suggests, may be a feeling of oneself into an object, 
but that object may have to be drained of its own substance before it 
will serve as an appropriate vessel.”47 The physician must guard against 
the potential for empathy to obscure or erase the patient’s experience 
rather than to facilitate an ethical response to it.
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Even those health care practitioners who consciously privilege their 
patients’ experiences find themselves caught in a knot of power relations. 
The physician is always in power in a medical context, and such power 
subsumes even deliberate attempts to displace authority by acknowledg-
ing the patient’s subjectivity. Physicians must somehow contend with the 
barrier of authority, beginning with recognizing that the patient is the 
authority on her or his own experience of illness. Many physicians have 
themselves experienced illness or disability, which may equip them to 
imagine what the patient feels. Clinical empathy thus reframed as expe-
rience-based imaginative engagement suggests that the sick or disabled 
physician might be especially empathic.48 For example, physician and 
author Rachel Naomi Remen incorporates her longtime struggle with 
Crohn’s Disease into a reconfiguration of the relation between doctor 
and patient. Without pretending to know patients fully or to share their 
darkest secrets, although dark secrets tend to emerge, she enters into a 
silent partnership as she works through what she calls “my own wounded 
healer, level-playing-field approach.”49 However, when empathy for a 
patient depends on the physician’s personal memories or feelings, it is 
necessary to recognize the danger of mere self-involvement, misread-
ing the patient as a projection of the physician’s necessarily limited and 
subjective experience.50
Future discussions of clinical empathy must resolve several issues, be-
ginning with the need to recognize that empathy can be self-interested 
and even potentially harmful and that an ethical practice of empathy 
involves collaboration with an individual patient as well as action taken 
to relieve the patient’s distress. These theories must also move beyond 
a reaction against the now outdated notion of “detached concern” and 
account for problems created in current reformulations where empathy 
depends on an imagined experience of the patient’s suffering, which can 
easily lead to faulty assumptions about the patient. And when theories 
of empathy do advocate involving the patient in a collaborative account 
of illness, they must also address the power differential in the clinic and 
include a critique of the institutional structures that accord health care 
professionals so much power over patients. As Benbassat and Baumal and 
Claudia Johnson caution, feeling distress over another’s suffering can be 
in itself the endpoint of empathy. To be ethical, clinical empathy must 
involve action, beginning with recognizing the broader social context of 
patients’ health and well-being. With appropriate cautions, theories of 
clinical empathy should extend beyond the individual relation to address 
socially determined inequities in health care.
Medical educators who theorize and practice reflective writing and 
the study of literature need to proceed with similar caution, especially in 
regard to the problematic supposition that writing “from a patient’s point 
of view” will develop empathy in medical students. And just as imagining 
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the patient’s perspective can diminish the patient’s authority rather than 
provide insight, studying literature as a means of mediating the over-
whelming impact of suffering can distract physicians and trainees from 
real suffering in the clinic. Adam Smith persuasively argues that aesthetic 
engagement cannot overcome the distance between fictive and actual 
experience. Readers, simply by closing the book, are always in control 
of calibrating the degree of distance and the intensity of engagement. 
Further, a consideration of the way that Smith reserves the practice of 
sympathy for a “civilized” elite raises the question of whether a complex 
understanding of sympathy, dependent on sophisticated engagements 
with theory and literature, is harmful in that it potentially excludes those 
who are less educated and/or simply less experienced with such prac-
tices. Finally, theorists who advocate an engagement with literature as a 
means of generating empathy must show how responses to and insights 
about literature transfer to the clinic. These problems represent not a 
dead end but rather a challenge to develop more sophisticated theories 
and practices of empathy. Critical theory and literary studies offer many 
resources for further formulations of empathy and related practices, espe-
cially as their insights inform the increased self-awareness and openness 
to discussion and criticism necessary for any ethical project.
Advocates of empathy in clinical practice and in medical education 
face serious challenges. Physicians are expected to master vast quanti-
ties of data—beginning with a trainee’s first years in medical school and 
immersion in the “fund of knowledge.”51 However, learning about the 
way an individual patient experiences and makes meaning from illness 
and the social context of that suffering is vastly different from the way 
students are tested on knowledge about the organ systems and disease. 
While students may seem to master knowledge of a first-person account or 
short story about illness, they must never assume mastery over knowledge 
of the patient. Theories of empathy must address tendencies to objectify 
the patient as a spectacle of suffering through which physicians exercise 
their own virtue. The responsibility that physicians bear in caring for pa-
tients is in itself a mode of power. The moral gravity of the patient who 
is vulnerable and in pain can be an instrument of power for any who at-
tempts to ameliorate that pain, whether that be a literary studies scholar 
or physician. Further, theories of empathy that emphasize interpersonal 
relations should not obscure the larger social contexts that determine 
illness and disability, beginning with inequities in access to and quality 
of health care based on ethnicity, class, gender, and sexual/affectional 
orientation. These problems compel rather than discourage the develop-
ment of sophisticated paradigms of empathy as a means of reframing the 
discussion of ethics in medical education and in clinical practice. 
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